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Abstract
Sir JamesMirrlees, co-recipient of the 1996NobelMemorial Prize inEconomic
Sciences, passed away in August 2018. This article outlines how his work
has transformed economists’ understanding of their discipline – from the
principles of tax design to the theory of contracts and beyond. By conceiving
of policy questions in terms of information asymmetries between governments
and taxpayers, Mirrlees demonstrated how to conduct convincing analysis of
redistributive objectives together with incentive effects in the design of general
tax systems and public policy more broadly. His ability to simplify complex
problems in ways that reveal their tractable essence means that his work has
yielded insights that have reverberated throughout the discipline. It has also
proved highly fruitful for practical policy design.
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I. Introduction
The work of Jim Mirrlees, who died in August 2018, transformed economists’
understanding of their discipline – from the principles of tax design to the
theory of contracts and beyond. He deepened knowledge of some of the most
important issues in microeconomic policy by solving questions conceived in
terms of the limited information of governments about taxpayers.
In so doing, he demonstrated how to conduct convincing analysis of
redistributive objectives together with incentive effects in the design of general
tax systems and, more broadly, of public policy. His ideas have proved fruitful
for theoretical economics beyond their original context and for practical policy
design.
II. Social welfare and public policy
Born in 1936 in a village in Galloway, near the southwest Scottish coast,
Mirrlees excelled at mathematics, which he studied as an undergraduate first
in Edinburgh then in Cambridge, where he was taught by Peter Swinnerton-
Dyer and by the Fields Medallist and Abel Prize winner Michael Atiyah. An
interest developed in philosophy and then in social science.
Finding in economics an opportunity to apply mathematical skills to
questions of ethical significance, Mirrlees began attending economics lectures.
The reduction of poverty in the underdeveloped world seemed to him to be
‘what really mattered in the world’1 and he wrote throughout his career on
questions of growth and development.
He proceeded to graduate study in the subject under David Champernowne
and Richard Stone and became involved in various economic projects on
growth in Cambridge, working, for example, as research assistant to Nicholas
Kaldor. Academic visits abroad to MIT and to India, and an advisory trip to
Swaziland, deepened his academic and practical economic interests.
In 1963, he took up a teaching fellowship at TrinityCollege, Cambridge, and
completed a doctoral thesis on optimal accumulation under uncertainty, which
was examined by Kenneth Arrow. In 1968, he moved to Nuffield College,
Oxford, where he became the Edgeworth Professor and remained until moving
back to Trinity in 1995. A year later, he was awarded the Nobel Prize, jointly
with William Vickrey. After retirement in 2003, he became Distinguished
Professor-at-Large at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Master of
Morningside College.
There is a view of the proper role and nature of economic analysis running
through Mirrlees’s major contributions. ‘Governments should do good and try
1Mirrlees, 1997.
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to work out how, specifically, they should do it’2 and a good way to do that is
‘to agree upon objectives, discover what is possible and optimize’.3
His view of that choice of objective drew him strongly towards
utilitarianism: basing policy on maximising the sum of measures of the well-
being of the individuals affected by the policy. He was far from being a naive
utilitarian optimiser, but he did see the utilitarian and optimising approaches
as crucial benchmarks. He wrote defending the coherence and attraction of
that viewpoint, showing the depth with which he thought not only about what
utilitarianism implied but also about why it made sense to him as an ethical
framework.4
Utilitarianism as a basis for tax design has the potential for strong egalitarian
implications. Redistribution through taxation can take income out of the hands
of rich individuals, who benefit from it least, and put it into the hands of poorer
individuals, who could gain from it more.
But that case for equalisation needed to be moderated to avoid discouraging
economic production. That much has been understood since at least the work
of late nineteenth century utilitarian political economists such as Francis
Edgeworth and Henry Sidgwick.5 As Edgeworth puts it, ‘the acme of socialism
is thus for a moment sighted; but it is immediately clouded over by doubts and
reservations’. Mirrlees’s contribution helps to disperse those clouds and reveal
how near or how far short of the summit the path reaches.
Government redistribution unavoidably distorts economic activity because
the government is imperfectly informed. ‘Public policies apply to individuals
only on the basis of what can be publicly known about them.’6
If the government knew everything about the individuals it wanted to tax,
then redistribution would take a very different form from what it does. The
government would be able to design taxes to make the more productive work
harder but without paying them in higher net income or consumption. It would
be possible to have the more able work harder while still distributing income
(and consumption) according to needs.
When the government only has imperfect information about an individual’s
productive capacity, it cannot follow such an apparently radical agenda. For
example, it cannot encourage more economically productive individuals to
reveal their higher earning capacity unless they are adequately rewarded for
doing so.
That seriously constrains the options for redistributing away from them.
Individuals will respond to government policy, whether that be taxation or




5Edgeworth, 1897; Sidgwick, 1883.
6Mirrlees, 1986.
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to them. Public policy problems therefore take a characteristic form, which
Mirrlees describes as ‘optimization subject to maximization constraints’.7
This is a perspective particularly suited to mathematical analysis. Indeed, it
poses the central questions of public policy in a way that allows their solution
to unfold in no other way. Mirrlees’s ability to frame questions of taxation in
simple but general forms amenable to such analysis allowed unprecedented
advances in understanding of how to handle them.
III. Commodity taxation
The case for designing commodity taxes so as to balance the distortions to
consumption of different goods has been recognised at least since the 1920s
when Frank Ramsey addressed and solved the problem of raising revenue
through taxes on different commodities in the way least harmful to consumer
welfare.8
Ramsey considered the effect on a single representative consumer only and
showed that an optimal solution, if commodity taxes were the only instrument
available to government for revenue raising, would mean ‘taxes should be
such as to diminish in the same proportion the production of each commodity
taxed’.9
The problemwas revisited byMirrlees in collaboration with Peter Diamond
in the 1960s. Their set-up was more general than Ramsey’s in allowing for
heterogeneous consumers and therefore ‘in considering the problem of income
redistribution together with that of raising revenue’.10 Two results stand out
from this work.
First, they show that in awide variety of circumstances, there is no argument
for distorting production (Mirrlees (1972) explores caveats). Distortion of
consumption and labour supply decisions may be an unavoidable feature of the
optimal tax policy, but there is no case for the economy to produce inefficiently.
Whatever the most desirable allocation of goods to consumers, the economy
should be producing at the frontier of what is possible.
This is not a result of merely theoretical interest; it has immediate practical
implications. Taxes should be designed to fall on transactions between firms
and households, but should leave transactions between firms untaxed. This is
the way that value added tax is structured and one of the key arguments for its
superiority as a way of collecting taxes on commodities.
Their second key result is that the simplicity of Ramsey’s solution needs
to give way to more complex rules under which the discouragement of
consumption of different commodities needs to be weighed against their
7Mirrlees, 1986.
8Ramsey, 1927; Samuelson, 1951; Stiglitz, 2015.
9Ramsey, 1927.
10Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971a.
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distributional advantages. A case for discouraging the consumption of one
good more strongly than another can be made if it is a bigger part of the
budget of richer households. Diamond and Mirrlees establish the formulae
under which this balance is struck optimally.11
In practical terms, this suggests that if commodity taxation is the only tax
instrument available for achieving redistributional ends – as could be the case,
for example, in the context of a developing country – then there could be
a case for higher taxation on goods that are consumed in larger proportion
by the rich even if demand for those goods is relatively price-sensitive. The
strength of that case is sensitive, however, to the unavailability of better means
of redistribution.
As noted in the Mirrlees Review, discussed below, this result on the
optimality of non-uniform indirect taxation is attractive advice for governments
that cannot redistribute effectively through direct taxation, but the practical
case for non-uniformity is less clear if income taxes can be non-linear.
IV. Non-linear income taxes
The nature of commodity taxation makes the problem of designing indirect
taxes conceptually simpler than that of designing potentially more complex
direct taxes. The way in which commodity taxes are typically collected at
multiple points of sale means that the rates of taxation cannot typically be
made to depend on how much of the good a person consumes. Commodity
taxation cannot therefore be other than proportional to amounts consumed.
That simplifies things in twoways. For one thing, it means that there are only
a finite number of tax rates to determine. More significantly, working out how
consumers would respond optimally to those taxes and the resulting changes
in prices is something that is well understood by economists, rendering the
‘maximization constraints’ in the Mirrleesian way of looking at the problem
relatively straightforward to formulate.
With direct taxation, things are very different. Income tax schedules and
systems of social security provision can be fiercely complicated. If we are
asking how to design those optimally, then the nature of the problem is not
only practically but conceptually challenging in a quite different way. Tax
rates need to be determined at every possible level of earnings, and figuring out
how to capture optimal taxpayer responses to the potentially highly irregular
schedule under design is bewilderingly difficult.
How do we even describe such a problem? Mirrlees’s Nobel co-
recipient William Vickrey wrote down the nature of the problem ‘somewhat
11Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971b; Diamond, 1975; Mirrlees, 1975.
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elliptically’12 in 1945, but it was not until Mirrlees’s (1971) breakthrough a
quarter-century later that the issue was adequately conceptualised and solved.
The key is to see it as an information question. Governments can monitor
how much people do earn, but they cannot know how much people could
earn unless they design taxes in such a way that people’s decisions will
voluntarily reveal it.Whatever combination ofwork hours and after-tax income
the government decides it wants someone to choose, it needs to make that
combination more attractive to them than what such a person could get by
posing as anyone less able.
Mirrlees worked through the implications of this – ‘incentive compatibility’
as it is called – showing how it can be seen as defining the rate at which taxpayer
well-being needs to increase with unknown earning capacity, and how this can
be used to derive the optimal schedule.
The formulae that describe the optimum separate out and clarify the
considerations underlying the optimum pattern of marginal tax rates. Rates
vary with earnings according to the local concentration of earning capacity, the
responsiveness of people’s decisions about their hours to economic incentives
and the gains from redistributing earnings towards or away from the point in
question.
As an intellectual achievement, this was a profound advance, establishing
a framework for serious intellectual discussion and quantitative analysis. But
as a contribution to practical policymaking, attention focuses on the concrete
content of optimal schedules.
Simulations in Mirrlees’s initial paper indicate that optimal rates are lower
than expected and fairly flat. ‘Perhaps the most striking feature of the results is
the closeness to linearity of the tax schedules . . . I had expected the rigorous
analysis of income taxation in the utilitarian manner to provide an argument
for high tax rates. It has not done so.’13
These findings have encouraged a picture of him as someone whose natural
egalitarian leanings were moderated under the pressure of economic realism.
He was not averse to letting his opinions change with evidence and considered
reflection, describing himself as someone who tried ‘not to suffer from moral
intuitions’. As he put it, ‘if utilitarianism is to be a valuable moral theory, we
had better be surprised sometimes by its conclusions’.14
He has said that his conclusions in the 1970s ‘had changed, as a result to
analysing economic models, which, at that time, seemed to have shown that
redistribution should be less than I had thought earlier’,15 but it is not true that




15As quoted in Klein, Daza and Mead (2013).
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His views responded to the great deal of work that followed on from his
initial paper and explored sensitivity to alternative specifications of individual
and social preferences and of the shape of the distribution of abilities.16 ‘Later
work shows that marginal rates of tax should . . . be greater than they were in
these first calculations. . . . Inmany cases,marginal tax rateswere highest in the
middle of the range of incomes, and fell towards higher incomes and lower’.17
One of the most well-cited and ‘notorious’18 results of the optimal tax
literature is that the marginal tax rate on the topmost income should be zero.
No distortion is needed where no one is more able. Moreover, if marginal tax
rates are a continuous function of earnings, then it follows that they should be
low near to the top.
It is obvious why such a finding should appeal to those who advocate low
taxes on the rich. But note that this is a result about marginal rates; it does
not mean that the optimal average tax rate at the top should be low, so it is
compatible with taxation still being highly progressive, in the sense of taxing
the rich on average at a higher rate. The result is not Mirrlees’s; it arose in the
work of Phelps (1973) and Sadka (1976) building on the Mirrlees model. Its
relevance relies on being able to identify in advance what the topmost ability is.
Mirrlees’s own view on the practical relevance of the finding was frank
and not favourable: ‘My paper only considered models with an unbounded
distribution of wage rates, and therefore did not have such a result. I believe
that was the right strategy. . . . The zero rate is . . . practically irrelevant. Nor
is it a good approximation to tax rates within, say, ten per cent of the highest
possible’.19
In fact, the Mirrleesian framework for income tax design has been
enormously influential in the practical redesign of tax and welfare systems
across the income distribution. Papers such as Piketty (1997), Diamond (1998)
and Saez (2001) have done much to facilitate a practical synthesis with the
results of applied work.
A direct example is the contribution of Brewer, Saez and Shephard (2010)
to the Mirrlees Review, discussed below, which, building on the work of
Saez (2002), pointed to substantial top marginal tax rates and an integrated
tax and transfer system similar to an EITC (earned income tax credit) with
negative marginal tax rates at the bottom and a smaller guaranteed income for
non-workers.
Mirrlees continued to work on optimal tax theory, leading to an eventual
synthesis from which general principles emerge for a world in which we allow
non-linearity not only in direct but also in indirect taxes.20
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In this work as in the famous result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), if
incomes can be taxed optimally and with enough flexibility, then assuming
individual preferences that are identical and that separate commodity demands
from work decisions in the right sort of way can be enough to eliminate the
case for differentiated indirect taxation. If we want to redistribute only between
those with different earning ability, if we can tax earnings flexibly and if there
is nothing we can learn from commodity purchases that could possibly help
distinguish between themore and less skilled over and abovewhat can be learnt
from their earnings, then there is nothing to be gained by taxing different goods
at different rates.
On the other hand, if these assumptions do not hold, then there are
circumstances in which ‘marginal taxes should be greater on commodities
the more able would tend to prefer’.21 It is attractive to think that radical
simplification of commodity taxation might be possible without compromising
redistributive objectives; this work clarifies howmuch and what exactly would
need to be true to argue such a case convincingly.
V. Moral hazard and principal–agent models
The standard Mirrlees income tax model has a very particular form of
information asymmetry. Taxpayers know their earning ability better than the
government but face no uncertainty. When they decide their work hours, they
know exactly what earnings that will imply. What if translation of effort into
earnings is uncertain?What if it is still true that taxpayers alone know theirwork
effort and government can base tax demands only on earnings but productivity
is known, even to workers, only after work decisions are made?
This turns the optimal tax problem into one with a different sort of
informational asymmetry: one where taxpayers are not characterised by hidden
knowledge but by a hidden action. To use the usual term of art, it becomes a
problem of moral hazard.
Mirrlees considered this problem too.22 Theway in whichmarginal tax rates
vary with earnings now needs to be designed not so as to encourage people
to reveal their privately known ability but so as to discourage the temptation
to low effort that comes from inability to distinguish its consequences from
bad luck. The pattern of optimal rates that comes out can differ markedly from
those in the model with hidden knowledge.
Both models are examples of what are known as principal–agent models.
Here the government is the principal and the taxpayer the agent, the principal
seeking to provide the agent with incentives to carry out actions on their behalf
21Mirrlees, 1976a.
22See, for instance, Mirrlees (1974 and 1990) on taxation of uncertain incomes specifically and Mirrlees
(1976b and 1999) on moral hazard more generally.
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to meet some objective in the presence of information asymmetry that limits
the principal’s ability to monitor the agent’s behaviour.
As recognised in the Nobel Prize lecture of a later laureate, ‘Mirrlees was
the first to study in generality the case where the agent provides a service to
the principal and the issue is how to motivate the agent to work diligently’.23
Such models have far broader applicability than to optimal tax problems, and
Mirrlees’s work consequently has major significance not only for questions of
public policy but for the development of contract theory in general, concepts
first introduced in his work proving to be fundamental to broader analysis.24
Social insurance against inability to work has a moral hazard aspect.
Working again with Diamond, Mirrlees looked at public policy questions
related to optimal design of public retirement provision. Their work25 puts
the problem into a setting in which moral hazard problems related to the
unobservability of true fitness for work prevent government from offering
fully fair insurance. The optimal insurance scheme typically involves positive
taxation of saving.
The bringing together of this sort of result on taxation of capital incomewith
Mirrlees’s analysis of optimum income tax design has provided the cornerstone
for the modern analysis of dynamic public finance.26
In these models, there is a combination of a static model that ‘builds
on the work of Mirrlees’ and incorporates ‘the insights of Diamond (1998)
and Saez (2001) into how empirical estimates of the labor supply elasticity
and the hazard rates of the income distribution can be used to obtain sharp
qualitative and quantitative predictions about optimal taxes and transfers’ with
a dynamic analysis that sets this within a ‘canonical life-cycle model with
idiosyncratic shocks’ so as to derive formulae that ‘link the optimal labor and
capital distortions with structural parameters of themodel that can be estimated
empirically’.27
VI. The Mirrlees Review
Mirrlees was at home in the abstractions of economic theory, but he was
also motivated by practical application. When the Institute for Fiscal Studies
decided to convene a review of the entirety of the UK tax system, 30 years
after the earlier similar review chaired by James Meade, Mirrlees was the
obvious person to invite to chair it. The Mirrlees Review sought to base
recommendations on ‘a systematic conceptual approach that joins together
our thinking across the whole range of taxes . . . rooted in economic theory
23Holmstro¨m, 2017.
24Dixit and Besley, 1997; Myles, 2008.
25Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978.
26Farhi and Werning, 2013; Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2015.
27Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2015.
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that models the constraints people face and the way they behave when taxes
change’.28
While optimal tax theory itself takes no position on how intrinsically
desirable public spending or redistribution is, it does insist that however much
revenue taxation raises and however much redistribution the system achieves,
it should do it with as little cost to efficiency as possible. To achieve that, the
tax system has to be seen as a whole. Nothing is gained by trying to get each
element of the system to appear to promote every objective in isolation.
On direct taxation, the Mirrlees Review recommended that different
components of the system should be better integrated and outlined how to
achieve that objective. On indirect taxation, it pointed out that there need to
be convincing reasons for departure from neutrality and that these are often
lacking. As regards taxes on transactions in assets, it argued that these have no
compelling economic logic and would be better replaced by a value added tax
on the services yielded by the assets.
The Mirrlees Review has been influential in numerous finance ministries
and treasuries. It has been translated into other languages and formed the basis
for tax reform programmes around the world.
To quote Larry Summers, former Secretary of theUSTreasury: ‘Theory and
practice rarely are brought together effectively. This volume is the best public
economics has to offer. It should be read by anyone who cares about the future
of taxation – that is anyone who cares about the future of government’. Mervyn
King, the then Governor of the Bank of England, commented: ‘Whatever view
you take of tax reform, you will need to read this volume in order to participate
in the debate’.
VII. Development and growth
Mirrlees’s insights were important in fields beyond tax design. They were
practically influential, for example, in the appraisal of public projects. His
work with Ian Little aimed to bridge the gap between the abstract concepts
of cost–benefit analysis and the practicalities of social investment decision-
making in developing countries.29
The Diamond–Mirrlees (1971a) result discussed earlier established the
desirability of production efficiency in public policymaking. This implies that
for small enough projects, resources used and outputs produced should be
weighed against each other at ‘shadow prices’ reflecting trade-offs at the
boundary of the economy’s production possibilities.
The work of Little and Mirrlees is an extended and meticulous source of
practical advice for performing project evaluations in settings of pervasive
28Mirrlees et al., 2011.
29Little and Mirrlees, 1969 and 1974.
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market failures and weaknesses of policy. For example, where the goods in
question are traded internationally, they propose that shadow prices should be
the prices at which they are traded at the border, whereas for goods that are not
traded, they should be appropriately constructed from those for traded goods
and for labour.
As regards social costing of labour, which might often in the context of
a developing country be drawn from underemployment in agriculture, they
argue for a shadow wage lying between the marginal product of labour in
agriculture and the market wage, so as to reflect the greater social value of
public than private income. Their work justifies and elaborates at length on
rules for dealing with the manifold issues and complications needing to be
addressed in consistent application of these ideas.
Shadow pricing methodologies were adopted widely in donor agencies
in the 1970s, particularly by the World Bank, and the Little–Mirrlees
recommendations were highly influential. The steep decline in interest since
the 1980s is described by them as a ‘shattering indictment’; reflecting on
the contribution of poor investment choices to low growth, they regret this
withdrawal from ‘an essential part of the business of avoiding these mistakes
in the future’.30
Mirrlees’s contributions to growth theory were also notable. His research
began, as noted earlier, in work with Nicholas Kaldor that explored the role
of technical change in growth, pursuing the implications of allowing technical
progress to affect production only through introduction of new equipment so
that increases in labour productivity become tied to gross investment.31
He continued to take an interest in growth questions, particularly those
concerned with the optimum level of saving. Here again he was digging deeper
into issues raised by FrankRamsey.32 The question here concerns distributional
ethics but to dowith distribution across generations: towhat extent can forgoing
of consumption by earlier generations be justified by gains to later generations
from greater capital accumulation?
The answer says something about both the right level of saving for society
and the shadow prices to apply to goods at different times in cost–benefit
appraisal. Ramsey’s initial treatment suggested a utilitarian case for very
high savings rates but raised challenging technical questions about whether a
well-determined optimum even existed given the indefinite duration of future
human generations. Mirrlees addressed these technicalities33 and explored
30Little and Mirrlees, 1991.
31Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962.
32Ramsey, 1928.
33Mirrlees and Hammond, 1973.
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extensions of the model to incorporate, for example, technological progress34
and economies of scale.35
VIII. Concluding comments
The contributions of JimMirrlees have enriched and informedmultiple fields of
economics. His specific investigations into tax and public policy have changed
the way that questions in those fields are discussed. His ability to simplify
complex problems in ways that reveal their tractable essence means that his
work has yielded insights that have reverberated throughout the discipline.
In practical terms, his insights have left us wiser and more able to see how
everything fits together. As evidenced by the Mirrlees Review, implications
can be radical and of policy relevance.
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